RE: draft-ietf-radext-digest-auth-06

["Nelson, David" <dnelson@enterasys.com>]

Does this resolve RADEXT Issue 138?

> The latest version of the draft does no longer contain a link between
> sips/https and
> RADIUS. However, the Security Considerations section names refusing
> sips/https request as one non-normative option to avoid the security
> level mismatch of sips/https and unencrypted RADIUS:
> 
> "To prevent RADIUS from representing the weak link, a RADIUS
> client receiving an HTTP-style request via TLS or IPsec could use an
> equally secure connection to the RADIUS server.  There are several
> ways to achieve this, for example:
>    o  the RADIUS client may reject HTTP-style requests received over
TLS
>       or IPsec
>    o  the RADIUS client require that traffic be sent and received over
>       IPsec.
> RADIUS over IPsec, if used, MUST conform to the requirements
> described in [RFC3579] section 4.2."

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