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Re: simple security
On 24/03/10 6:12 AM, "Rémi Denis-Courmont" <remi@remlab.net> wrote:
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> On Tue, 23 Mar 2010 11:14:00 -0700, Victor Kuarsingh
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> <victor.kuarsingh@gmail.com> wrote:
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>> I think that it's premature to assume the "home" network is ready for
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>> unrestricted connectivity. The dynamics of the "home" networks are
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>> changing so fast, that the risks of this environment are not known.
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>
>
> I said we need a ***hole punching*** mechanism.
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>
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> Without hole punching application programmers will be stuck with UDP for
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> peer-to-peer use cases. And that's not good (I'd expect the IETF Transport
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> Area not be very happy with that, but IANAAD). No connection semantics, no
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> error correction, no flow/congestion control. If my memory is not failing
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> too badly, James Woodyatt also had a companion draft for that purpose. But
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> it's now defunct a document.
=> FYI We tried this in:
http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-soliman-firewall-control-01.txt
There might be other proposals but I belief the strength of this proposal is
the effective plug n play security feature of CGAs.
Hesham
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>
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> Then there is the proven issue that battery powered devices cannot cope
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> with stateful firewalling too well, unless the timeouts are long and
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> _known_. Typically they are short (especially for UDP). And with stateful
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> firewalling they aren't known. If the timeouts are not known, the
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> application ends up making the most pessimistic assumption (i.e. less than
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> 30 seconds). That's not sustainable with the current battery technology,
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> and won't be for years to come if the experts of that domain are to be
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> trusted.
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>