Re: draft-ietf-v6ops-v6inixp-04.txt WGLC

[Eduardo Ascenço Reis <eduardo@intron.com.br>]

Hi Roque,

This is my last message to this thread just to conclude the
participation and enforce the go ahead to this document.

I was previously trying to highlight that globally routing (or not)
IXP IPv6 LAN is not only related to measurement and security (DoS)
points, but also with routing between IXP participants. And how they
deal with NEXT_HOP attribute on IPv6 prefixes learned from other
participants is an important matter.

But I also agree that this topic is out of scope to this document.

Considering that, I would like to suggest the following change to the text:

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3.  Addressing Plan
(...)

 When considering the routing of the IXP LANs two options are identified:

   o  IXPs may decide that LANs should not to be globally routed in
      order to limit the possible origins of a Denial of Service (DoS)
      attack to its particpants' AS boundaries.

   o  IXP may decide that LANs should be globally routed.  In this case,
      IXP LANs monitoring from outside its participants' AS boundaries
      is possible but the IXP LANs will be vulnerable to DoS from
      outside of those boundaries.

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

So, removing the following part:
"      In this configuration
      participants may route these prefixes inside their networks (e. g.
      using BGP no-export communities or routing the IXP LANs within the
      participants' IGP) to perform fault management.  Using this
      configuration, the monitoring of the IXP LANs from outside of its
      participants' AS boundaries is not possible."

Thanks,

-- 

Eduardo Ascenço Reis