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Re: draft-ietf-opsec-logging-caps-03
Hi Patrick,
Comments inline....
patrick cain wrote:
> Ron,
>
> When George and I wrote the logging caps doc, we specifically stayed away
> from the log message 'collector' as opposed to the log message 'generator'.
> We had some, um, disagreements, but George convinced me that was the right
> thing to do. I expected some of the log processing things, like "what
> happens when a component send a million messages" would fall into the
> collector category. But I guess one of the router interfaces could be
> considered a 'component' so we should address the issue.
>
> So...
>
> 1. I will craft some capabilities for the million message scenario. I'm not
> sure that there are 'bcps' for these actions, though.
> - I will add a capability to efficiently handle rapidly generating
> significant numbers of log messages to not overwhelm the delivery mechanism.
> Example is syslog's "last message received XX times". I'm not sure than SNMP
> has an equivalent mechanism, unless rate limiting outbound SNMP counts. :(
>
> - for the 'log is full' case:
> "The device should be configurable to either: a) stop
> logging to all devices, b) drop the oldest log messages, or c) stop logging
> to the local device, when the local logging device is full."
Sounds good...
>
> 2. I will add words to 2.16 for "sensitive configuration information".
Also sounds good.
I will put the draft in the "Revised ID Needed| substate. You and Ross
can decide whether these changes require another WG last call.
>
> 3. The original goal of the document and the WG was to make the three
> capability documents BCPs. Otherwise we could have saved lots of time just
> spewing words, not trying to figure out what ISPs and vendors actually do or
> want.
Understood. And I think that you have succeeded in that goal!
Ron
>
> Pat
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-opsec@psg.com [mailto:owner-opsec@psg.com] On Behalf Of Ron
> Bonica
> Sent: Thursday, June 28, 2007 4:55 PM
> To: opsec@ops.ietf.org
> Subject: draft-ietf-opsec-logging-caps-03
>
> Folks,
>
> The following are a few comments from AD review:
>
> - In Section 2.16, all sensitive configuration information needs to be
> protected. This includes thinks like cryptographic keys as well as
> passwords.
>
> - Do we need another requirement that says that it should be difficult, if
> not impossible, to alter the local copy of a log?
>
> - How should the system behave if some components spews 1,000,000 instances
> of the same log message in a 5 second period?
>
> - How should the system behave if some component spews 1,000,000 different
> messages in a 5 second period.
>
> - How should the system behave when all of the space for local logging is
> exhausted. Drop oldest messages? Tail drop?
>
> - We will probably have to decide if this doc is BCP or INFO.
>
> Ron
>