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Re: [idn] IDN spoofing
- To: George W Gerrity <g.gerrity@gwg-associates.com.au>
- Subject: Re: [idn] IDN spoofing
- From: William Tan <wil@dready.org>
- Date: Mon, 21 Feb 2005 22:36:50 +1100
- Cc: List Unicode <unicode@unicode.org>, idn@ops.ietf.org
- In-reply-to: <4aba7a4184c288476e81eadc047c15c8@gwg-associates.com.au>
- References: <4aba7a4184c288476e81eadc047c15c8@gwg-associates.com.au>
- User-agent: Mozilla Thunderbird 1.0 (Windows/20041206)
George W Gerrity wrote:
For the second-level (or third-level where the top is a country code)
domain tag, it should be the legal responsibility of the name
authorities for the domain above to ensure that spoofed names cannot
be registered (or if registered, all belong to one owner). In the
Western world, if that is not already the case, then I'm sure that the
first time a spoof of, say Coca-Cola (or Pepsi â let's be even-handed)
is registered, then we can be certain that afterwards, the issuing
authority will never do it again.
While it is true that TLDs are responsible for preventing the
registration of spoofs, commercial TLDs that have automated registration
systems never perform that check. Does registering coca-cola.com prevent
someone else from getting coca-co1a.com?
In the case of countries whose law systems are still a bit wild and
wooly (The former Soviet Union?), then I suspect that for the time
being it will remain âCaveat Emptorâ. In either case, a domain name
holder should be able to license all spoofs for free, in order to
limit its exposure to spoofing, whether or not there is adequate legal
recourse.
If the TLD operator is careful, there is no need to license spoofs to
protect one's domain from being spoofed. On the other hand, if the TLD
does not even perform that check (such as .com), then it is unlikely
that you get to license all spoofs for free anyway - you have to pay for
each and every permutation of it.
The point I'm making is that while the authorities for .com.au or
.com.ru may do what they like, we can at least give them advice plus
some tables that will detect many, if not most, spoofs. In the case
where the authority allows (for whatever reason) a name with mixed
orthographies, then clearly the first to apply whose signature is not
a spoof for an (already well-established) trade-marked name or domain
name, should get the license, and all other applicants with a similar
name be refused. The name authority should be protected by the laws of
the countries in which it operates from being sued for refusing to
register confusable names.
This is a fairly interesting proposal, i.e. to use the bundling (see
draft-klensin-reg-guidelines or rfc3743) to solve the homograph problem
at the registry level, provided we can come up with a satisfactory table
of lookalikes.
As an example, the word "coke" can be represented completely in Cyrillic
homographs, so one can generate 16 combinations of ASCII and Cyrillic
characters forming strings that look like "coke". When you register
"coke.com", the other 16 variants are automatically tied to this domain
(for free or for a fee). They can be either all activated (put into the
zone file) or simply blocked from registration.
The good thing about this is that the lookalikes mapping table does not
have to be set-in-stone at the protocol level, but individual registries
may choose to implement whatever makes sense for them.
The problem with this is that the number of variants gets out of hand
pretty quickly, and most registry systems aren't equipped to deal with
bundles.
wil.