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RE: [eap] RE: [Isms] RADIUS is not a trusted third party



Title: RE: [eap] RE: [Isms] RADIUS is not a trusted third party
The use of RADIUS itself without a defined extension such as EAP-TLS or EAP-PEAP over RADIUS cannot securely pass attributes between entities. Note that the defined EAP-TLS (or other EAP mechanisms) over RADIUS provides for secure attribute passing between entities even through proxies. 
 
I thought that I was passing familiar w/EAP-TLS (and even more so w/PEAP), but I am completely unaware of such capabilities.  Would you mind explaining how this is achieved, given that RADIUS & EAP are completely different protocols?

Martin.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: isms-bounces@lists.ietf.org
> [mailto:isms-bounces@lists.ietf.org] On Behalf Of Thierry Moreau
> Sent: April 22, 2005 1:56 PM
> To: Bernard Aboba
> Cc: radiusext@ops.ietf.org; isms@ietf.org; eap@frascone.com
> Subject: Re: [eap] RE: [Isms] RADIUS is not a trusted third party
>
>
> Thanks for these explanations.
>
> See comments in-line below.
>
>
>
> Bernard Aboba wrote:
>
> [... explanations about end-to-end (NAS to server) and current RADIUS
> protocols ...]
>
> >
> > Are you proposing creating a new RADIUS security model that
> would only
> > be used by ISMS?  That seems like a lot of work for little overall
> > benefit to the RADIUS community.
> >
>
> I did assume that an implementation-specific attribute to the RADIUS
> Access-Accept packet would pass unmodified through a RADIUS
> proxy, which
> in fact is a matter of proxy policy (RFC2865 , section 2.3).
> With this
> erroneous assumption, I thought I was proposing an
> implementation-specific use of existing RADIUS protocol
> facility. I did
> not expect any "benefit to the RADIUS community".
>
> >
> >
> > Rather than designing a new version of RADIUS to meet its needs, it
> > seems more profitable for ISMS to either figure out how to use the
> > protocol as it exists today, or to summarize its
> requirements for new
> > work and ask that it be chartered outside of ISMS.
> >
>
> Point well taken. I just looked at RFC3576, abstract reproduced below
>
>     "This document describes a currently deployed extension
> to the Remote
>     Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS) protocol, allowing
>     dynamic changes to a user session, as implemented by
> network access
>     server products.  This includes support for disconnecting
> users and
>     changing authorizations applicable to a user session."
>
> Unfortunately, the security section of RFC3576 raises a number of
> concerns. E.g. the following sentence: "It is RECOMMENDED
> that IPsec be
> employed to afford better security."
>
> Again, thanks for your comments.
>
> --
>
> - Thierry Moreau
>
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