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What about X.805? (was RE: Control Plane Security of ISP Network)



For definitions, why not use X.805? What are people's thoughts on X.805?

http://www.ietf.org/IESG/LIAISON/itut-sg17-ls-x805-end2end-communication
s.pdf

Is a good place to start.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-opsec@psg.com [mailto:owner-opsec@psg.com] On 
> Behalf Of Smith, Donald
> Sent: Monday, June 06, 2005 7:40 AM
> To: pmrn; Miao Fuyou
> Cc: Merike Kaeo; opsec@ops.ietf.org; eludom@gmail.com
> Subject: RE: Control Plane Security of ISP Network
> 
> While OOB for management is a good idea many ISPs do 
> management in band.
> By splitting the traffic into "planes" it allows us to 
> discuss the functions and security of those functions.
> So in my opinion control plane (dynamic routing updates, 
> semiautomic communications), management (user initiated, 
> interactive, possibly scripted or automated management), and 
> data or user plane ( the actual application data, session 
> setup etc...) are good abstracts.
> Miao, if you get a draft control plane security document 
> written I would be happy to review it and provide comments.
>  
> Clearly my definitions of data, mgmt, and ctrl planes are not 
> complete;) A good definition of the ctrl plane will probably 
> be a good place to start.
> Do we include icmp port/host/net unreachable and other icmp 
> error messages in the control plane?
>  
>  
>  
> 
> donald.smith@qwest.com giac 
> 
> 	-----Original Message-----
> 	From: owner-opsec@psg.com [mailto:owner-opsec@psg.com] 
> On Behalf Of pmrn
> 	Sent: Monday, June 06, 2005 4:15 AM
> 	To: Miao Fuyou
> 	Cc: 'Merike Kaeo'; opsec@ops.ietf.org; eludom@gmail.com
> 	Subject: Re: Control Plane Security of ISP Network
> 	
> 	
> 	Feels like going back to the old days of SS7, 
> ISDN........ It possible to separate the management network 
> and adequately secure it. As person who has implemented very 
> large scale service provider networks, I understand the 
> importance and concern about security but, going back to 
> yesterady may not be ideal solution.  
> 
> 	The plane separation you are describing is generally 
> known as out-of-band management and generally implemented in 
> large carrier scale networks for security reasons and to 
> alleviate many traffic engineering issues.  
> 
> 
> 
> 	Pall Ramanathan
> 
> 	
> 
> 	
> 	
> 
> 	
> 	
> 
> 	
> 	
> 
> 	Learn like you will live for ever and Live like you 
> will die tomorrow-Gandhi
> 
> 
> 	On Jun 6, 2005, at 5:42 AM, Miao Fuyou wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> 		Hi Merike:
> 
> 		In the past1.5 years I was involved in 
> development of standard of router
> 		security requirement. During the development 
> there are a lot of discussions
> 		on security of control plane. Quite a few 
> professionals from SPs gave much
> 		concerns and ideas on planes seperation, which 
> is to seperate control and/or
> 		manage plane from end user/data plane 
> physically or logically. Actually OOB
> 		management is one such solution with 
> physical/logical seperation mechanism
> 		to seperate management traffic from end user 
> data, which makes it impossible
> 		for attack on data plane to launch an attack to 
> management interfaces or
> 		systems. As for control plane, while some SPs 
> are practicing plane
> 		seperation by VPN or other technology, it is 
> much more sophisticated than
> 		management plane. I think planes seperation 
> should be considered in
> 		Practices draft, specifically section 2.5.7. 
> 
> 		Route authentication, which is identified in 
> Practices draft section 2.5.7,
> 		is extremely important security aspect of  
> control plane in spite of
> 		criticism for MD5 weaks and cumbersome 
> configuration. Sometimes Filtering
> 		helps control plane security,  but it is not 
> complete. So a new Capability
> 		draft is required to describing security 
> capabilty of route authentication
> 		and control plane seperation. I will trying to 
> write a very initial draft
> 		before IETF 63 meeting to give primary idea.
> 
> 		Wish the same also answers questions of Mr. 
> George Jones in another mail.
> 		Thanks!
> 
> 		Miao Fuyou
> 
> 		-----Original Message-----
> 		From: Merike Kaeo 
> [mailto:merike@doubleshotsecurity.com] 
> 		Sent: Friday, June 03, 2005 1:08 PM
> 		To: Miao Fuyou
> 		Cc: opsec@ops.ietf.org
> 		Subject: Re: Control Plane Security of ISP Network
> 
> 
> 		Hello Miao.
> 
> 		Yes,  more text needed to be added to address 
> current control plane 
> 		security
> 		practices and in the next version of the 
> document you will see this 
> 		addition.
> 
> 		As to having another capabilities document, 
> that depends on how much 
> 		overlap
> 		there is with filtering.  Were you proposing to 
> author such a document?
> 
> 		- merike
> 
> 		On Jun 2, 2005, at 7:49 PM, Miao Fuyou wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 			Hi, All:
> 
> 			In the Pratices 
> document(draft-ietf-opsec-current-practices-00.txt)
> 			routing
> 			control plane security is explicitly 
> identified as an important aspect 
> 			of
> 			network security. Sp network is 
> comprised of the most essential assets 
> 			and
> 			facilities to provide service for 
> customer. IP is liable to attack on
> 			control plane and the consequences of 
> such attack usually are very 
> 			serious.
> 			So, it is the foremost concern for ISP 
> to protect control plane from 
> 			attack
> 			inside or outside. In order to mitigate 
> security risk on control 
> 			plane, we
> 			need a lot of work to do on 
> standardization except filtering, logging 
> 			or dos
> 			tracing. Actually some security 
> mechnisms are identified in Pratices
> 			document for control plane, BGP MD5 for 
> example, but I think there are 
> 			still
> 			other important aspect to identify. For 
> example, quite a few SP use 
> 			VPN to
> 			seperate user/customer traffice from 
> core network keep the attack on 
> 			SP core
> 			from user/customer away from control plane.
> 
> 			So I suggest following change,  (1) to 
> add more text to Pratice
> 			document to
> 			reflect more security pratices on 
> protecting control plane of SP 
> 			network (2)
> 			we need another Capabilty document to 
> cover control plane security of 
> 			SP
> 			network wihtout confliction on content 
> with other Capabilty documents, 
> 			such
> 			as filtering.
> 
> 			Miao Fuyou
> 			Data Communication, Wireline Research
> 			Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
> 			TEL: 86-10-8288 2502
> 
> 			
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