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Francis Dupont wrote:
> In your previous mail you wrote:
> Our problem is not ownership. It is surviving changes in existing
> connectivity without opening the door to hijacking or DoS. All we need
> to authenticate is that after a multihoming event, we are still
> talking to the same entity at the other end.
> => this is a different problem: the binding between the identifier and
> the locators and we can divide it into three parts:
> - can be the multi-homing signaling modified by an attacker on the path?
> - have we to trust the peer not to give a fake locator?
> - have we better properties about locators?
> As in multi-homing we have static locators even the last part can be
> a reasonable goal.
> But the subject of this thread is "Identifiers" so I don't understand
> your intent...
My intent is to observe that for the problem this WG is supposed to
solve, we don't care whether the claimed identifier at the beginning
of a session is genuine. What we care about (rather like TLS) is whether
the two communicating entities remain the same even if the session suffers
a rehoming event. I don't think we are disagreeing.